In Judicial Review of National Security, David Scharia explains how the Supreme Court of Israel developed unconventional judicial review tools and practices that allowed it to provide judicial guidance to the Executive in real-time. This raises the question: How was the Court actually able to uphold this challenge? The empirical results provide qualified support for the use of separate opinions as dissonance reduction mechanisms, suggesting that dissonance theory both is applicable to the actions of elite decision makers and enjoys validity outside of a laboratory setting. Devoted to good policy as a goal, attitudinal judges act directly on their policy preferences without calculating the consequences of their choices. Applying this theory to the members of the U. Of the frameworks and theories that psychologists have developed for the study of cognition, the concept of motivated reasoning has the clearest relevance to the interests of political scientists in judicial behavior. The Supreme Court of Israel provides an excellent case study of a different approach, which allows judges to assess military action in real-time and to issue non-binding results of their evaluation.
I appreciate the leave provided by Ohio State, which made it possible to focus on completion of the book. These and a number of other questions are addressed in this topical volume in a comparative and interdisciplinary prospective. This view of justices as policy maximizers is widely shared though not universally — see, e. For example, regarding the final two stages involving opinionwriting and coalition formation and then the final vote, it was assumed that each justice evaluates a draft majority opinion in terms of whether it is an improvement over the current legal status quo: if the draft opinion is at least as good as the current legal status quo for the justice, the justice will support the opinion; if the draft opinion is worse than the current legal status quo for the justice, the justice will not support the opinion. I uncover three noteworthy findings: 1 a clear correlation between prior executive branch experience and support for the executive branch, 2 the degree of this support intensifies with increased executive branch tenure, a finding congruent with a socialization hypothesis, and 3 contrary to received wisdom, executive powers cases possess a clear ideological dimension, in line with the expectations of the attitudinal model.
I hypothesize that Democratic judges would be less likely to rule in Nader's favor as compared to Republican judges. In those models judges are impervious to influence from others, or they are susceptible to this influence only for instrumental reasons—in the case of the Supreme Court, as a means to help them achieve good legal policy. Because with a nod to Holmes experience rather than logic vitalizes law, stare decisis has developed as an informal norm that may occasionally bend to changing circumstances. I need to brood, he explained. .
Political scientist Lawrence Baum offers a new perspective on this crucial question, a perspective based on judges' interest in the approval of audiences important to them. Establishing 'jurisprudential regime theory' as a framework for incorporating the various factors that can affect decision-making, the author draws on quantitative, qualitative and interpretive methods in order to analyse the justices' changing treatment of content-based and content-neutral cases over time. This book offers a fresh perspective on this crucial question, a perspective based on judges' interest in the approval of audiences important to them. Changes in Percentages of Pro—Civil Liberties Votes from Terms 1—2 to Later Periods, Using Adjusted Voting Scores 6. Nor, I suspect, would most students of judicial behavior dissent from this interpretation. Chuck Myers did a great deal to make this book possible, and I am very glad that I have had the opportunity to work with him.
While legal stability is generally favored, little empirical research has focused on whether it may be encouraged or discouraged within courts via institutional design. Consequently, there is a strong need for theoretical work on the research that focuses on courts, judges and the judicial process. Scalia may seek to shape attitudes about legal issues within the public and the legal community, ultimately helping to win judicial support for the policies he favors. The book is structured into two elements: first, how the operation of the new selection mechanisms is captured and analyzed from different vantage points, and secondly, having mapped the ground, the book critically and comparatively engages with selected common themes, examining the new mechanisms with respect to values and principles such as democracy, judicial independence, transparency, representativeness, and legitimacy. While greater legal stability is generally preferred, absolute legal stability would produce a rigid legal paradigm impervious to changing societal norms and practices. Judge Nadel had good reason to think that his chances for reelection would improve if his ruling was consistent with the strong views of many Cincinnati voters.
We evaluate the hypothesis that minority status constrains Courts of Appeals judges when they cast votes in panels, hypothesizing that judges in the circuit minority will vote less ideologically than their counterparts in the circuit majority. Faced with a free speech case, the law-minded judge simply seeks the best interpretation of the First Amendment. I argue that Court curbing can affect judicial independence because it can be a credible signal about waning judicial legitimacy, which is essential for the efficacy of an independent judiciary. Judicial scholars have generally relied on two types of models to explain and predict the behavior of judges: legal and extra-legal models. Are these institutional reforms successful in guaranteeing greater quality of the judicial candidates? My summary of strategic models indicates my own usage of the term.
This paper builds on our previous work to further advance our argument that the legal status quo is a critical aspect of Supreme Court decision-making. Summary What motivates judges as decision makers? This book presents the perspective that resulted from my thinking about judges and their audiences. State judges who lack life terms might balance policy goals against their interest in remaining judges. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. But they argue that in two respects, strategic considerations have only limited impact on the positions of Supreme Court justices. To be sure, similar points have been made in a comparative context, and Vanberg's 2005 and Helmke's 2005 studies stand out as notable examples of such research.
Nor, of course, are they responsible for any limitations that remain. Should a justice engage in attitudinally inconsistent behavior, there is ample potential for the public to view that justice in a negative light, perceiving the justice as being unreliable or hypocritical. But the value of distinguishing himself from Judge Wilkinson may have led Luttig to accentuate his conservative stances on free speech and environmental protection in these cases. The judge might also try to avoid a decision that provokes Congress to enact legislation limiting free speech. This study departs from the literature on institutional legitimacy in an important way—I argue that congressional hostility towards, and attacks on, the judiciary indicate a lack of judicial legitimacy and public prestige. Indeed, such models facilitate the study of behavior by making analysis more manageable.